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FROM WHITEHALL TO JEDBURGH :
PATRONAGE NETWORKS AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE SCOTTISH
BORDERS, 1603 TO 1625 *
ANNA GROUNDWATER
University of Edinburgh
A B S T R ACT. When James VI and I arrived in London in 1603, he created a new bedchamber, which he
ﬁlled with Scottish courtiers. This he positioned, antagonistically as it turned out, between himself and the
more English privy chamber. These Scottish courtiers thus had the most intimate access to James, and were
able to exercise great inﬂuence over the distribution of James’s favour. Whilst their importance has been
debated within an English context, their signiﬁcance within James’s government in Scotland has not yet been
addressed. These Scotsmen became the focus for patronage networks stretching from Whitehall, through the
privy council in Edinburgh, to the Scottish regional elites, and helped James retain the co-operation of those
elites. Against the background of attempts to gain fuller union, James sought to demonstrate the beneﬁts of
regnal union by prosecuting a paciﬁcation of crime within the Scottish and English Borders, now rechristened
the Middle Shires. Patronage networks from Whitehall to Roxburghshire secured the co-operation of the
Scottish Borders elite, whilst acting as conduits for information and advice back to Whitehall. This article
will suggest that these relationships were integral to Scottish governmental processes in James’s absence,
providing a much-needed cohesive force within his fragile new multiple monarchy.
When James VI and I arrived in London in 1603, he found a court staﬀed,
naturally enough, by Englishmen. In order to retain the services of Elizabeth’s
able administrators and the loyalty of England’s elites, he kept most of the existing
English privy councillors, and the English gentlemen of the privy chamber. He
was keen also to maintain the co-operation of the Scottish elites and balanced the
composition of the privy chamber by introducing into it some Scotsmen.
Additionally, in one of the more antagonistic innovations of the regnal union, he
instituted a bedchamber, physically positioned between him and the privy
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chamber, which he ﬁlled with Scotsmen.1 The privy chamber was no longer so
privy. The privileged Scottish gentlemen and grooms of the bedchamber thus had
the closest and most frequent access to James : they embodied the ‘point of con-
tact ’ between monarch and petitioner, and, to the irritation of English members
of parliament, great inﬂuence over the distribution of signiﬁcant amounts of
patronage.2 Whilst these courtiers beneﬁted personally from the lands, oﬃces,
titles, monopolies, and patents they could harvest for themselves, their intimate
access also enabled them to look after the interests of their kinsmen and allies
back home. As a result, these courtiers became the focus of extensive patronage
networks that stretched fromWhitehall, through the Scottish privy council, to the
Scottish landed elite.
These chains of patronage were not, however, one-way conduits. Whilst such
networks channelled wealth and titles northwards, courtiers were dependent on
their aﬃliates to maintain their own interests in Scotland in their absence.
Similarly, James was reliant on the continuing co-operation of Scotland’s landed
elite in the implementation of his policies there, and on the information circu-
lating within these networks of the current situation in Scotland. Patron–client
networks could facilitate government, creating conduits for the transmission of
orders to Scotland, the ﬂow of information back to Whitehall, and securing and
rewarding co-operation. They were signiﬁcant too in the practical administration
of James’s policies, inﬂuencing the staﬃng of oﬃces at council, court, and re-
gional levels. The interpersonal relationships within such networks were thus
crucial to the operation of government within James’s fragile new composite
monarchy. More than this, they could act as a cohesive force binding together
two of its kingdoms, particularly necessary given the tensions that frustrated
James’s attempts to achieve political union.
These tensions were evident within Scotland as early as 1604 when some
Scotsmen voiced concern over their king’s departure : a convention of the royal
burghs at Haddington lamented they ‘regraitt the lois sustenit be Scottis men be
his maiesteis absence, and thairfoir to desire [th]at his majeste may remayne in
Scotland yeirle ane quarter of the yeir and sie justice administratt ’.3 Similarly,
where the good burgesses of Edinburgh had been accustomed to regular contact
with the Scottish court at Holyrood, James dining occasionally at the house of
provost Nicol Uddert, in 1617 these same burgesses complained that James’s lack
1 Neil Cuddy, ‘The revival of the entourage: the bedchamber of James I, 1603–1625’, in David
Starkey, ed., The English court : from the Wars of the Roses to the civil war (London, 1987), pp. 173–225;
Cuddy, ‘Anglo-Scottish union and the court of James I, 1603–1625’, Transactions of the Royal Historical
Society, 5th ser. 39 (1989), pp. 107–24; Cuddy, ‘Reinventing a monarchy: the changing structure and
political function of the Stuart court, 1603–38’, in Eveline Cruikshanks, ed., The Stuart courts (Stroud,
2000), pp. 59–85, at pp. 67–8, 70–5.
2 For a discussion of the signiﬁcance of such access, in a Tudor context but with relevance to
the Stuart court, see Geoﬀrey Elton, ‘Tudor government : the points of contact ; III. The court ’,
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th ser. 26 (1976), pp. 211–28.
3 James D. Marwick, ed., Records of the Convention of Royal Burghs of Scotland (2 vols., Edinburgh,
1866–70), II, p. 190. Thanks to Dr Alan MacDonald for this point.
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of consultation over his grants of Scottish patents was greatly to their prejudice.
Although patronage networks could facilitate communication and co-operation,
for those not lucky enough to be part of such networks, James’s absence could be
keenly resented.4
Tensions were also evident in the attitude of some English members of par-
liament to Scottish courtiers. In 1610, Sir John Holles voiced the feelings of many:
‘ the Scottish monopolise [James’s] princely person, standing like a mountain
betwixt the beams of his grace and us ’, and from ‘this inequality proceedeth a
twofold unequal distribution of beneﬁts ’, the English starving outside James’s
presence. By the ‘grace of their place all favours and honours directly or in-
directly pass through their hands’.5 This was partly a xenophobic reaction no
doubt, in 1612 Chamberlain observing that ‘here have happened two or three
accidents of late very unluckely, that make some boyling twixt the Scottes and our
nation ’.6 Neil Cuddy’s article on the antagonism stimulated by the creation of a
Scottish-dominated bedchamber links this discontent to wider English resistance
to fuller union, as does the work of Jenny Wormald and Keith Brown on the
simmering anti-Scottish sentiment at court. Brown’s conclusions that there was
remarkably little anglicization of Scottish nobles or integration of them into
English society demonstrate the underlying friction.7 Similarly, the English par-
liament’s debates of 1607 over the naturalization of Scotsmen indicated con-
siderable English resistance to Scottish intrusion.8 One needs to look no further
than Bruce Galloway’s study of the union negotiations from 1603 to 1607 to see
how such distrust stymied James’s attempts to achieve full union in the parlia-
ments of 1604 and 1607.9
James was not alone in Europe in having to govern a newly composite kingdom
and attempt to bind its constituent parts more closely.10 Like the Spanish crown
and the Portuguese nobility from 1580, and, from 1587, the Vasa kings of Poland
4 M. Wood, R. K. Hannay, and H. Armet, eds., Extracts from the records of the Burgh of Edinburgh
(9 vols., Edinburgh, 1927–67), II, pp. 160–2, 241.
5 Historical Manuscripts Commission (HMC) Report on the manuscripts of … the duke of Portland :
preserved at Welbeck Abbey (10 vols., London, 1891–1931), IX, p. 113. Cuddy, ‘Revival of the entourage’,
pp. 199–200. John Chamberlain was often caustic about the Scottish presence, recounting John
Hoskins’s notorious ‘Vesperae Sicilianae’ speech against the Scottish courtiers of 1614. The letters of John
Chamberlain, ed. N. E. McClure (2 vols., American Philosophical Society, 1939), I, pp. 510, 538.
6 Chamberlain, Letters, I, p. 348.
7 Cuddy, ‘Anglo-Scottish union and the court of James I ’ ; Jenny Wormald, ‘O brave new world?
The union of England and Scotland in 1603’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 127 (2005), pp. 13–36;
idem, ‘ James VI and I: two kings or one?’, History, 68 (1983), pp. 187–209; K. M. Brown, ‘The
Scottish aristocracy, anglicization and the court, 1603–1638’, Historical Journal, 36 (1993), pp. 543–76, at
pp. 544–6, 552–5, 557–8.
8 Journals of the House of Commons, 1547–1626 (London, 1803), i, pp. 1033–4.
9 Bruce Galloway, The union of England and Scotland, 1603–1608 (Edinburgh, 1986). See also Allan I.
Macinnes, ‘Regal union for Britain, 1603–1638’, in Glenn Burgess, ed., The new British history : founding a
modern state, 1603–1715 (London, 1999), pp. 33–64, at pp. 35–8, 45; Brian P. Levack, The formation of the
British state : England, Scotland, and the union, 1603–1707 (Oxford, 1987).
10 Mark Greengrass, ‘ Introduction: conquest and coalescence’, in Mark Greengrass, ed., Conquest
and coalescence : the shaping of the state in early modern Europe (London, 1991), pp. 1–24; John Huxtable Elliott,
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and the nobles of Lithuania, it was important that James avoided alienating the
elites of his kingdoms. Spanish kings used generous patronage to retain the loyalty
of provincial elites in the Iberian peninsula, Naples, and Milan. In the newly
expanded kingdom of France too, ministers such as Richelieu, Mazarin, and
Colbert sought to integrate the newly acquired peripheral provinces, Alsace and
Franche-Comte, and the Pays d’E´tat, including Burgundy and Languedoc; they
did so by actively promoting the distribution, as Sharon Kettering has shown, of
‘ royal patronage to secure provincial loyalty and support ’ amongst the nobility.11
Similarly James, by appointing a preponderance of Scottish courtiers to his
family’s households in London, was able to retain the co-operation of members of
the Scottish elite, in London, and through their connections in Scotland. He
made co-operation with him seem attractive, promoting a mutuality of interest.
Recent analysis by American historians of the global exercise of power by the
United States has relevance here : in seeking to understand why American foreign
relations do better in some areas than others, Joseph S. Nye distinguishes between
types of power, between ‘hard ’ and ‘soft ’. Hard power implies coercion, through
judicial, economic, or military force, whilst soft power is the art of achieving one’s
objectives through persuasion, inﬂuence, attraction, a mutuality of interests, co-
opting rather than coercing. Soft power has the added beneﬁts of being usually a
cheaper option than forcibly imposing a government’s will on another sovereign
state, as well as encouraging long-term co-operation.12
This was important in terms of the government of Scotland in James’s absence.
James may have become a king of England, but in his actions within his former
homeland, it was as a king of Scotland that he continued to reign, Scottish sov-
ereignty being retained after regnal union. Whilst James and his English council
sent reams of directives north, Scottish government was conducted on a daily
basis by a Scottish privy council. Robert Cecil, the earl of Salisbury, may have
formulated policy for Scotland, but policy in Edinburgh was implemented by the
chancellor, the earl of Dunfermline, and his councillors exercising their own
discretion.13 The Scottish council was able to resist unpopular or unworkable
‘A Europe of composite monarchies ’, Past and Present, 137 (1992), pp. 48–71; Thomas Ertman, Birth of
the Leviathan: building states and regimes in medieval and early modern Europe (Cambridge, 1997).
11 Elliott, ‘A Europe of composite monarchies’, pp. 54–6; Edward Opalinski, ‘The path towards
the commonwealth of the two nations’, in Allan I. Macinnes, and Jane Ohlmeyer, eds., The Stuart
kingdoms in the seventeenth century : awkward neighbours (Dublin, 2002), pp. 49–61, at pp. 57–9; Sharon
Kettering, Patrons, brokers and clients in seventeenth-century France (Oxford, 1986), pp. 5–11, quotation at p. 6;
Kettering, ‘Brokerage at the court of Louis XIV’, Historical Journal 36, 1 (1993), pp. 69–87, at pp. 69,
71–2, 82, 86–7; William Beik, Absolutism and society in seventeenth-century France : state power and provincial
aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge, 1985).
12 M. J. Braddick, State formation in early modern England, c. 1550–1700 (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 340, 346,
359; Joseph S. Nye, Soft power : the means to success in world politics (New York, NY, 2004), pp. 5–11.
13 As Julian Goodare observes ‘ there was still only one privy council. Not only did it not move to
London, but no second council for Scottish aﬀairs was established. ’ Not only was it able to make its
own decisions, but that it ‘was the government, or at least the daily central government ’. Julian
Goodare, The government of Scotland, 1560–1625 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 142, 138.
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directives from London and continued making many of its own. The Lithuanian
situation had similarities (though not identical) : whilst the Lithuanian and Polish
parliaments had been merged, Lithuanian oﬃces, administration, and legislation
remained separate from those in Poland, in the same way that Scottish adminis-
trative and legal systems remained distinct. Both Scotland and Lithuania con-
tinued, as John Elliott observes generally of such unions, aeque principaliter, ‘ to be
treated as distinct entities, preserving their own laws, fueros and privileges ’. By
allowing Scottish elites some self-government, James avoided alienating them.
This could, as Elliott discerns in the Spanish composite monarchy, give ‘ the most
arbitrary and artiﬁcial of unions a certain stability and resilience’.14 In the Iberian
peninsula, in the 1630s, previously cordial relations were reversed, however, when
Philip IV’s minister, Count Olivares, abruptly changed policy towards Portugal,
seeking a greater degree of conformity ; this alienated some of the Portuguese
elite, ultimately resulting in the Portuguese revolt of 1640.15 In contrast, in 1655,
the Lithuanian nobility, careful to protect their considerable rights within the
Polish-Lithuanian union resisted moves to sever their alliance in the face of
Swedish and Muscovite aggression, protecting the eighty-six-year-old Union of
Lublin.16
James was also having to manage elites in Ireland and Wales. Here, he could
draw on the experience of the previous Tudor administrations, though Henry
VIII’s success in maintaining cordial relationships with the Welsh gentry after
the union of 1536 was not replicated by Elizabeth with her reluctant subjects
in Ireland.17 In Wales, the gentry enthusiastically embraced the opportunities
created by the introduction of justices of the peace into the new shire system, co-
operating with this extension of Tudor authority ; Mike Braddick underlines the
‘mutualities of interest ’ with the English crown that encouraged the integration of
the Welsh elites into the new administrative structures ; and the Welsh gentry
were increasingly tightly linked into English society through marriage, education,
and their membership of the English parliament. Unlike Scotland, Welsh sover-
eignty was subsumed within that of the English state, and English law replaced
ancient Welsh customs and independent jurisdictions. The Welsh, however, did
not feel their identity under pressure from the Tudors ; the Welsh view of ‘Britain’
came, as Gwynfor Jones says, from a ‘historical perspective of the British past ’.
This diﬀered from that of Scotland or Ireland, helping the successful transfer of
14 Elliott, ‘A Europe of composite monarchies ’, pp. 52–3, 57, 61–2; Opalinski, ‘The path towards
the commonwealth’, pp. 57–8.
15 Elliott, ‘A Europe of composite monarchies ’, pp. 54–6; Greengrass, ‘ Introduction: conquest and
coalescence’, pp. 11–13, 16–17.
16 Opalinski, ‘The path towards the commonwealth ’, pp. 57–60.
17 For Wales, see J. Gwynfor Jones, Early modern Wales, c. 1525–1640 (Basingstoke, 1994) ; Braddick,
State formation in early modern England, pp. 347–55; Peter Roberts, ‘The English crown, the principality of
Wales, and the Council in the Marches, 1534–1641’, in Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill, eds., The
British problem, c. 1534–1707: state formation in the Atlantic archipelago (Basingstoke, 1996), pp. 118–47. For
Ireland, see Ciaran Brady, ‘England’s defence and Ireland’s reform: the dilemma of the Irish viceroys,
1541–1641’, in ibid., pp. 89–117.
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Welsh allegiance from a Tudor monarch of England, to a Stuart one of the British
archipelago.18
Ireland was more problematic. Henry VIII’s declaration of his kingship of
Ireland in 1541 was based on his hopes of securing ‘ the cooperation of existing
elites in transforming the basis of political authority in Ireland’, the ultimate
failure to attain which Braddick attributes to the ‘stumbling block ’ of the
Protestant Reformation and the alienation caused by forcible and insensitive re-
forms.19 The working relationship that existed between the Catholic Old English
elite in the Pale and the English crown was undermined by the stridently
Protestant Elizabethan conquest from the 1570s, the Old English increasingly
looking towards Gaelic elites for support.20 The Stuart plantation of Ulster was no
more successful in achieving the coalescence of the Old English elites with English
government ; plans to cultivate or ‘civilize ’ Ireland, to persuade, ended in co-
ercion. Both Tudor and Stuart monarchs failed to establish a mutuality of interest
with the Irish as they had with the Welsh, and then Scottish, elites, at least under
James VI and I. The exercise of ‘ soft power ’ amongst the Welsh and Scottish had
retained their co-operation, whilst from the 1570s onwards, ‘hard power’ was to
alienate those in Ireland it was necessary to attract. For many historians, the Irish
experience of English monarchy was colonial, in contrast to the integration of
Welsh elites into Tudor and Stuart government, and in contrast again with the
preservation of Scottish sovereignty after 1603.21
The relationships maintained between James, his courtiers, the council in
Edinburgh, and the Scottish regional elites gave James a means to integrate the
Scottish elites into the government of the composite kingdoms. For England,
works by such as Pauline Croft, Linda Levy Peck, Peter Seddon, Neil Cuddy, and
others have demonstrated the signiﬁcance of relationships between the members
of James’s council and household within the conduct of English government.22
18 Braddick, State formation in early modern England, p. 347 ; Jones, Early modern Wales, pp. 27, 31, 42–6,
78–81, 88–9, 101–3, quotation at p. 43.
19 Braddick, State formation in early modern England, pp. 379–97, quotations at pp. 379–80.
20 Nicholas Canny, ‘Irish, Scottish and Welsh responses to centralization, c. 1530–c. 1640: a com-
parative perspective’, in Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer, eds., Uniting the Kingdom? The making of
British History (London, 1995), pp. 147–69, at pp. 150–3.
21 For comparisons between Wales and Ireland, see Brendan Bradshaw, ‘The Tudor Reformation
and Revolution in Wales and Ireland: the origins of the British Problem’, in Bradshaw and Morrill,
eds., The British problem, pp. 39–65, and, with Scotland, Steven G. Ellis, ‘Tudor state formation and the
shaping of the British Isles ’, in Steven G. Ellis and Sarah Barber, eds., Conquest and union : fashioning a
British state, 1485–1725 (London, 1995), pp. 40–63; Steven G. Ellis, Tudor frontiers and noble power : the
making of the British state (Oxford, 1995).
22 Pauline Croft, ‘Can a bureaucrat be a favourite? Robert Cecil and the strategies of power’, in
J. H. Elliott and L. W. B. Brockliss, eds., The world of the favourite (London, 1999), pp. 81–95; Cuddy,
‘The revival of the entourage’ ; idem, ‘Anglo-Scottish union and the court of James I ’ ; Linda Levy
Peck, ‘Monopolizing favour: structures of power in the early seventeenth century English court ’, in
Elliott and Brockliss, eds., The world of the favourite, pp. 54–70; Linda Levy Peck, Northampton: patronage
and policy at the court of James I (London, 1982) ; P. R. Seddon, ‘Patronage and oﬃcers in the reign of
James I’ (Ph.D. thesis, Manchester, 1967).
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Keith Brown’s article on anglicization valuably summarizes the oﬃces held by
Scotsmen in James’s court and council, but not their involvement in Scottish
aﬀairs. Little work yet exists that considers the function of the Scottish courtiers in
London within the governance of Scotland.23 The position of Robert Ker, the
earl of Somerset, for instance, has been addressed but solely within the terms of
the English court.24 Work is needed on what his years in favour meant for
government in Scotland. This article will show how Somerset’s patronage net-
work, amongst others, helped James to secure his government in Scotland, the
connections within the networks providing channels for patronage and com-
munication, between Whitehall and the Scottish regions. Concentrating on one
region, the Scottish Borders, it will demonstrate how these networks facilitated
the paciﬁcation of crime there from 1603 to 1625. Given that the paciﬁcation was
undertaken partly in order to further union, it will also consider how such con-
nections can be seen to be acting as a cohesive force within James’s fragile new
composite monarchy. The co-operation of the elite in the Scottish Borders, as in
all Scotland, whether coerced, induced, rewarded, or instinctive, was crucial to
the successful imposition of policy, and to the future of the union.25
I
The role of patronage, and patronage networks, in early modern government
needs further examination. Patronage, whilst it had the obvious function of doling
out lands, oﬃces, titles, monopolies etc., needs to be seen in terms also of what it
could achieve for the person distributing it. In James’s government, this meant
not only securing co-operation, but also that of all those active participants in the
patronage networks that stretched to Scotland. Patronage was the playing out of
relationships that were mutually beneﬁcial to both patron and client, and that
client’s client and so on down the chain. Whilst patronage secured and rewarded
service, it also underlined the status of the patron, demonstrated his inﬂuence,
enhanced the bounteousness of his reputation. He was seen to be in a position to
make things happen, inﬂuence outcomes; it gave him the appearance of power.
Contemporarily, this inﬂuence was talked of as ‘power ’. The earl of Somerset
used the word himself in writing of what he was able to do, and others used it
in reference to him. He was seen to have power to make things happen: thus
the Venetian ambassador reported, in 1611, that ‘It would seem that he is to
dispose of everything’ and as a result ‘everybody is endeavouring to secure his
23 Brown, ‘Scottish aristocracy’, pp. 553–4, 569–70; Maurice Lee, Great Britain’s Solomon: James VI
and I in his three kingdoms (Chicago, IL, 1991) pp. 240–1; Macinnes, ‘Regal union for Britain’, pp. 49–50.
24 P. R. Seddon, ‘Robert Carr, earl of Somerset ’, Renaissance and Modern Studies, 14 (1970), pp. 48–68;
Croft, ‘Can a bureaucrat’, p. 91.
25 Mike Braddick notes the ‘willing cooperation of local elites ’ with the state, including in Scotland,
where the mutuality of interest between crown and nobility encouraged their co-operation in the
suppression of feuding from the 1590s: State formation in early modern England, pp. 337–9, 358–60,
quotation at p. 338.
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favour ’.26 Envious English courtiers certainly equated Somerset’s inﬂuence over
patronage with power.
There is, however, debate over the signiﬁcance of that power, much of which
has centred on whether courtiers exerted any inﬂuence on royal policies. For
Cuddy, the bedchamber, with its ﬁscal and legal immunities and constant access
to James, formed a counterbalance to the council. Moreover, he concludes that
James exploited the role the bedchamber played in ‘patronage, administration
and politics … to give himself freedom of action as against the dominance of the
Elizabethan council he had inherited. A dual-centred politics, of entourage and
council ’ had emerged, which allowed James to exercise his prerogative more
freely. Salisbury’s failed attempts to wrestle the bedchamber’s powers of patron-
age for the council, in 1607 and 1608, attests to the contemporary view of cour-
tiers’ powers.27 Pauline Croft questions the political inﬂuence of favourites,
however, pointing to the huge control that councillors, especially Salisbury,
continued to exert within policy-making. Certainly Somerset was not remotely in
the league of minister-favourites such as Cardinal Richelieu in Louis XIII’s
government or the count of Olivares at Philip IV’s court in Madrid; though
Somerset’s successor, George Villiers, duke of Buckingham, Linda Levy Peck
concludes, ‘was the only English or Scottish favourite to achieve the power’ of
these continental ﬁgures.28 But to see power here only in terms of policy-making is
to obscure the inﬂuence that the courtiers could exert in the processing of any such
policy beyond the bounds of Whitehall. Moreover, to see government only in
terms of the force it can bring to bear on society, the exercise of ‘hard power ’,
fails to appreciate the other means through which a government can achieve its
objectives. Patronage was largely the use of ‘ soft power ’, since it helped to attract,
to persuade co-operation with government (though the removal of favour, and
the negative inﬂuence that courtiers could exert against an enemy were perhaps
‘harder ’). Finally, in an age of personal monarchy and of less institutionally de-
veloped government, we need to see government in terms of the interaction of the
people participating within it, as well as its institutions : as William Beik concludes
of seventeenth-century France, networks of clientage provided a ‘system of
government in which networks of personal loyalty and institutional lines of
authority were interconnected, aﬀecting the very nature of political power ’,
calling ‘ into question the centrality of institutions per se ’ ; the focus is now on the
personal ties ‘which provided ‘‘ substance’’ to the ‘‘ form’’ of the institutions ’.29
The Scottish courtiers were able to exert such inﬂuence because their domi-
nance of the bedchamber gave them almost unrivalled access to James.30 This
26 National Archives of Scotland (NAS), Lothian papers, GD40/2/13, fos. 2, 20; Calendar of state
papers … Venice, 1603–1675 (CSP Ven), ed. H. F. Brown et al. (38 vols., London, 1864–1947), XII,
pp. 135–6. 27 Cuddy, ‘Reinventing the monarchy’, pp. 72–3.
28 Croft, ‘Can a bureaucrat ’, pp. 90–1; Peck, ‘Monopolizing favour’, p. 59.
29 Beik, Absolutism and society, pp. 15–16.
30 For Kevin Sharpe, ‘access to and inﬂuence at court was the ﬁrst goal of all political ambition’ :
‘Crown, parliament and locality : government and communication in early Stuart England’, English
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meant that they could judge the most propitious moment to present suits to their
temperamental master. In 1615, Murray of Elibank asked one gentleman, John
Murray of Lochmaben, to ‘present [a letter] when the kingis maiestie salbe found
in gud humour and at lasour to read it ’, whilst in 1614 the Scottish chancellor, the
earl of Dunfermline, observed to Lochmaben that, if he that was ‘daylie atten-
dentis, domestic, and hamelie with his Sacred Majesty can not move his Majesty ’,
then nothing could.31 On a more quantiﬁable level, they were able to obtain the
royal signature to the warrants and orders they presented to their king.32 Cuddy
estimates that one sixth of signatures to signet warrants were procured by the
bedchamber in 1614 – and that this ﬁgure had risen, by 1624, to nearly a half.
Moreover, one of the bedchamber held the privy purse which gave him access to
a stamp of the king’s signature. This oﬃce was held ﬁrst by the Scottish earl of
Dunbar, then by his proxy, and after his death, in 1611, by another borderer,
Lochmaben, later earl of Annandale.33 The case of Dunbar also concerned a
ﬁgure that exerted inﬂuence in James’s household and within his councils. Until
the appointment of George Villiers in 1615 to the bedchamber, Scotsmen out-
numbered English by eight to one; there were no English grooms of the bed-
chamber until 1617.34
The connections established through patronage were visible in the patronage
networks focused on these courtiers. Whilst James was the chief fount of all
patronage, the courtiers formed a second horizontal layer in a pyramid of
patron–client relationships that widened through those courtiers’ own patronage
networks. These relationships, oiled by the material beneﬁts of patronage, were,
however, underwritten by more complex obligations and loyalties associated
with kinship and friendship, clientage and deference, and the legitimation of the
patron’s authority. Like all early modern oﬃce-holders, his credibility depended,
as Braddick surmises, on the ‘reception of his performance ’, and his upholding
of ‘values of honour, degree and dignity ’. On a lighter level, he had to look the
part, the need for costly clothing an impediment to impecunious Scottish suitors
at court. But more seriously, if the patron was not seen to be fulﬁlling his side of
the bargain, the client was not bound to provide the service ; the patron’s status
rested partly on the acknowledgement of his superiority by the client, and this in
turn rested on the patron’s ability to secure what was promised. Most historians
now emphasize the reciprocity of the patron–client relationship.35 The rhetoric of
Historical Review, 101 (1986), pp. 321–50, quotation at p. 324; Peck, ‘Monopolizing favour’, p. 63;
Cuddy, ‘Reinventing a monarchy’, p. 71–2.
31 National Library of Scotland (NLS), Denmilne, Adv. MS 33.1.1, vol. 6, fo. 52, vol. 5, fo. 143.
32 Elton, ‘Tudor government : the points of contact ’, pp. 216–17.
33 Cuddy, ‘Revival of the entourage’, pp. 177, 183, 185, 187. Dunbar’s tenure as keeper of the privy
purse, May 1603–Apr. 1605. The National Archives (TNA), E351/2792.
34 Cuddy, ‘Revival of the entourage’, pp. 86 n. 22, 190, 206–8.
35 Kettering, Patrons, brokers and clients, pp. 16–18; Braddick, State formation in early modern England,
pp. 87–8; M. J. Braddick, ‘Administrative performance: the representation of political authority in
early modern England’, in M. J. Braddick and J. Walter, eds., Negotiating power in early modern society :
order, hierarchy and subordination in Britain and Ireland (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 166–87, at p. 171.
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patronage and clientage was characterized by the recognition of obligations, in
phrases such as being ‘bound to your kindnes and guid will ’. Here, the writer
further recognized that the favour was ‘done to a freind, to ane kinnisman’ ;
though not a kinsman, he was reminding the courtier of the mutually beneﬁcial
obligations associated with kinship that were being replicated within this
patron–client relationship.36 The highest oﬃce-holders in the land, near the apex
of a pyramid of patronage, were connected by these reciprocal obligations to the
broader stratus of oﬃcials implementing James’s policies in the regions.
Patronage networks had a number of diﬀerent functions. On a political level,
they allowed inﬂuential courtiers and councillors to build up a network of oﬃce-
holders, a political clientele, that helped them to fulﬁl their duties, and underlined
their status. William Beik describes the ‘networks of cliente`les ’ maintained by
Richelieu, Mazarin, and Colbert in Languedoc, where they placed their allies in
inﬂuential oﬃces. Signiﬁcantly, those networks did not long outlast the downfall
of their chief patron, oﬃce-holders ousted as the new minister-favourite’s network
was established.37 In contrast, as we shall see, Somerset’s Scottish network of Kers
and Murrays, evident in the placement of his kin in positions of considerable
authority in Edinburgh and the Borders, did withstand its patron’s removal,
secured by 1615 through these oﬃcials’ own patronage networks. As discussed,
these networks staﬀed oﬃces and channelled rewards, thus participating in the
implementation of policy. They encouraged the co-operation of governing elites,
to tie these elites into the government of the three kingdoms linking, as Beik
observes, ‘national client systems and locally-based power centres ’. One beneﬁt
was the social cohesion encouraged by these links that cut down through the
socio-economic strata, but less beneﬁcially, close personal ties, often of kinship,
could reinforce political factions.38 Crucially, networks also provided conduits for
communication, information, and advice. In a typical phrase, in 1604 James
asked Lord Spynie to continue ‘giving your best advise in our aﬀaris ’. As Kevin
Sharpe puts it, such two-way communication was ‘ the binding thread of
government ’, which a king blocked at his peril.39
I I
In 1603 one of James’s preoccupations was to establish a fuller union between
Scotland and England than the merely dynastic union; a ‘perfect union’, in
which both England and Scotland would beneﬁt since, in his memorable phrase,
‘Two great snow-balls put together, make the one greater. ’40 James targeted one
particular area to exemplify the beneﬁts of union, the previously separate English
36 NLS, Denmilne, Adv. MS 33.1.1, vol. 5, fo. 103.
37 Kettering, Patrons, brokers and clients, pp. 3–5, 7, 11 ; Beik, Absolutism and society, pp. 15–16, 234–44.
38 Peck, ‘Monopolizing favour’, pp. 56, 62; Beik, Absolutism and society, pp. 233, 239.
39 NLS, Denmilne, Adv. MS 33.1.1, vol. 1, fo. 12; Sharpe, ‘Crown, parliament and locality ’, pp. 336,
339–40, 346, quotation at p. 324.
40 King James VI and I, Political writings, ed. Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge, 1994), p. 177.
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and Scottish Borders, rechristened in 1603 the ‘Middle Shires ’.41 In 1598, James
had prophesied (over-optimistically) in Basilikon Doron, that on his succession to
the English throne, and the disappearance of fraught Anglo-Scottish relations, the
Borders ‘will be the middest of the Ile, and so as easily ruled as any part thereof ’.42
As a novel cross-border entity, these shires were intended to represent the har-
monious heart of the newly uniﬁed kingdoms, the composite British monarchy in
microcosm. To ensure this, from 1605 James instituted a paciﬁcation of crime
there in which cross-border co-operation was meant to show the new working
relationships within the regnal union. In doing so, he was to employ the patron-
age networks headed by Somerset and other Border courtiers to secure the co-
operation of the local nobility and lairds in the paciﬁcation.43
Successive Tudor and Stuart kings sought to reduce their several borderlands
to civility and co-operation, with varying degrees of success. These apparently
turbulent marcher societies, characterized, it was thought, by the semi-indepen-
dent jurisdictions of clan-based, militarized lordships, were increasingly viewed
as obstructive, ﬁrst to the extension of Tudor crown authority, and then to the
integration of the composite kingdoms under James VI and I. Steven Ellis detects
a sea-change in Tudor policy in the 1530s, in which Henry VIII made inappro-
priate attempts to impose a centralized style of government, more suited to the
English lowlands, on the Welsh marches, the Irish Pale, and the English Borders.
The marcher lordships of Wales found as many as 5,000 people removed from
their numbers under Henry’s ruthless agent, Rowland Lee, during his presidency
of the Council in the Marches in the years surrounding the Anglo-Welsh union of
1536.44 Here, however, the careful inclusion of the Welsh gentry in the intensiﬁ-
cation of Tudor government precluded the alienation felt, in the English north
initially, and in Ireland in the long term. In the English Borders after 1603,
James’s paciﬁcation was achieved through the co-operation of the local gentry
for whom it was politically advantageous.45 Despite the potential for good rela-
tions provided by the Old English elite in the Irish Pale, the alienation of some
caused by Henry’s suppression of the earl of Kildare, and the introduction of
English viceroys, led to the break-out of rebellions in 1568–73 and 1579–83,
and culminated in the Nine Years War from 1593.46 The viceroyship was an
unenviable position, having to reconcile Old English interests with the need for
41 The register of the privy council of Scotland, 1545–1625 (RPCS), ed. J. Buron and D. Masson (13 vols.,
Edinburgh, 1877–98), VI, pp. 560–1. 42 James, Political writings, p. 25.
43 Michael B. Wasser, ‘The paciﬁcation of the Scottish Borders, 1603–1612’ (M.A. diss., McGill,
1986) ; Jared Sizer, ‘Law and disorder in the ‘‘Middle Shires ’’ of Great Britain, 1603–1625’ (Ph.D.
thesis, Cambridge, 2001) ; Anna Groundwater, The Scottish Middle March, 1573 to 1625 : power, kinship,
allegiance (Woodbridge, 2010), ch. 7.
44 Ellis, Tudor frontiers, pp. 5, 16, 254–5, 267–70; Jones, Early modern Wales, pp. 58–70.
45 Sheldon J. Watts and Susan J. Watts, From Border to Middle Shire Northumberland, 1586–1625
(Leicester, 1975) ; R. T. Spence, ‘The paciﬁcation of the Cumberland Borders, 1593–1628’, Northern
History, 13 (1977), pp. 59–160; Maureen M. Meikle, A British frontier ? Lairds and gentlemen in the eastern
Borders, 1540–1603 (East Linton, 2004); Diana Newton, North-East England, 1569–1625: governance, culture
and identity (Woodbridge, 2006). 46 Ellis, ‘Tudor state formation’, p. 61.
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administrative and judicial reforms, and the defence of the border that the
Pale constituted between England and Gaelic Ireland, and Catholic Europe.47
Nicholas Canny condemns James for allowing his oﬃcials to exacerbate this
alienation leaving a festering sore for his son.48
James could not be accused of similar neglect in the Scottish Borders. In 1605,
he appointed two separate commissions, one for each side of the border, to co-
ordinate the paciﬁcation of crime, the principal Scottish commissioner being
Sir Gideon Murray of Elibank. The commissioners were assisted by a mounted
guard, the Scottish guard captained by Sir William Cranstoun. Subsequent in-
demnities to both commissioners and guards show how ﬁercely they undertook
their duties. In 1606 James, thinking progress was too slow, appointed his fear-
some agent George Home, the earl of Dunbar, as lieutenant of the whole Middle
Shires. Crucially, Dunbar was the only person, apart from James himself, ever to
have jurisdiction on both sides of the border. His vigorous suppression of crime,
in order to underpin the regnal union, replicated that of Rowland Lee in the
Welsh marches, which the Anglo-Welsh union of 1536 had helped to facilitate.
As one of James’s most trusted Scottish courtiers, Dunbar’s career exempliﬁed
the way in which government policy, conceived in London, could be commu-
nicated to, and executed, within the Scottish Borders. After 1603, he remained
lord treasurer of Scotland whilst, in England, James made him chancellor of the
exchequer until 1606, master of the great wardrobe, gentleman of the robes and
keeper of the privy purse, thus holding oﬃce in both the royal household and the
English and Scottish councils.49 Following his Borders posting, Dunbar was
careful to sustain his connections, returning regularly to hunt with James and
maintaining an intimate correspondence with Salisbury.50 His activities in the
Borders remained closely linked into the central governments of the two king-
doms. He was eminently suitable for a Borders lieutenancy, as a member of the
powerful Home kindred of the eastern Borders, and having the vested interests
and authority of a landowner on both sides of the border. In his combination of
oﬃces and connections, Dunbar represented the way government was conducted
at the heart of the composite kingdom. Contemporarily, Dunbar was widely
credited for the successful suppression of crime in the region, even his rival,
Dunfermline, writing to James with ﬂowery approval.51 The last old style cross-
border raid into north Northumberland, in 1611, was very much an exception.
Exhausted by the constant travel necessary to maintain his links with London,
Dunbar died that year. The Borders, however, did not cease to be viewed as an
47 Brady, ‘England’s defence and Ireland’s reforms’, pp. 89–90, 92, 99–102.
48 Canny, ‘Responses to centralization’, pp. 163, 169.
49 HMC, The manuscripts of the marquess of Salisbury (24 vols., London, 1883–1970), XVIII, p. 371 ; Cuddy,
‘Revival of the entourage’, pp. 175, 187, 189, 198; Jared Sizer, ‘The good of this service consists in
absolute secrecy: the earl of Dunbar, Scotland and the Border, 1603–1611’, Canadian Journal of History,
36 (2001), pp. 229–57.
50 HMC Salisbury, XVI, p. 78, XVII, pp. 223–4, 591, XIX, pp. 31, 44, 164, 184, 192, 207–8, 209–10, 247,
254, 315, 350–1. 51 NLS, Denmilne, Adv. MS 33.1.1, vol. 3, fo. 23.
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area of concern and sporadic government action continued until the mid-1620s.
But no one after Dunbar was to replicate his stature as a bridge between the
governments of the two kingdoms in this cross-border region.
In terms, however, of government within the Scottish Borders, the continu-
ation of eﬀective links was discernible from Whitehall to shire level. Elibank, who
came closest to Dunbar’s authority within the Scottish council and the Borders,
remained commissioner until 1617, whilst being appointed, in 1610, a JP for
Selkirkshire and a privy councillor, and, in 1612, deputy treasurer until his death
in 1621.52 The concentration of such local and national powers within his hands
was to make Elibank a signiﬁcant governmental force in the Borders and a vital
link to government in Edinburgh. Indeed, he embodied the connection between
the two. Elibank was well remunerated for his service : he accumulated lands in
Peeblesshire and near Melrose, and a pension continued posthumously to his
son’s beneﬁt. Such rewards illustrated how James used grants of land and oﬃces
to secure the service of local elites in his increasingly intensiﬁed government
within the Scottish regions.
This was true not just of those appointed to border-speciﬁc oﬃces : James also
achieved the co-operation of prominent landholders in the Borders, who might
have felt their existing authority threatened by this forceful paciﬁcation.53 Two
key ﬁgures were Robert Ker of Cessford, the former Middle March warden,
created Lord Roxburgh in 1600, and Walter Scott of Buccleuch, created Lord
Buccleuch in 1606. Both had been repeatedly accused by the English of cross-
border crime prior to 1603; now both became central ﬁgures within James’s
government, at local and national levels. The Buccleuchs especially were involved
with the paciﬁcation, Lord Buccleuch receiving a council citation in 1608 for his
eﬀorts. His son, also Walter, was one of the triumvir commissioners of the Middle
Shires appointed in 1622 to reinvigorate judicial eﬀorts within the more trouble-
some dales, where he had large landholdings. Additionally, the government was
able to utilize the informal authority that Buccleuch and Roxburgh held as
leaders of the huge Scott and Ker kindreds respectively, and as landlords with
private jurisdictions. Buccleuch’s commission in 1622 speciﬁcally referred to
the ‘power and frendschip ’ that he had in the region.54 Their co-operation was
rewarded by their appointment to the oﬃces of councillor and JP, extensive
grants of land and, ﬁnally, an earldom apiece. James’s use of patronage was to
secure Buccleuch and Roxburgh’s long-term service in the paciﬁcation and on
52 RPCS, IX, pp. 54, 75–6, 523, XI, pp. 11–12.
53 As elsewhere in Scotland, owners of baronies held private jurisdiction within them and did
challenge some external summonses, though the commissioners’ powers usually superseded these.
Also, as elsewhere, the sheriﬀs of the Borders shires held heritable jurisdictions, though those of
Berwick and Selkirk surrendered them before 1625. Generally, however, the holders of these
jurisdictions did not use them to obstruct the paciﬁcation, their extra judicial power usually being used
co-operatively, they themselves members of the wider patronage networks. RPCS, 2nd ser., I, p. 659;
Julian Goodare, State and society in early modern Scotland (Oxford, 1999), pp. 89–90.
54 RPCS, XII, pp. 675–9.
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the Scottish council, beneﬁting that institution with the local knowledge and
authority that they could provide.
Such displays of patronage had become even more important as James moved
south in 1603, when he needed to retain the loyalty of his landed elite in the
Borders within the paciﬁcation. Roxburgh accompanied James to London in
1603 and, in early 1614, his marriage to Jane Drummond, the chief lady of the
queen’s household, was celebrated at Somerset House with feasting and masques
paid for by the queen.55 Jane had been the recipient of a large pension of £500
from 1610 and continued in her household until 1617. Roxburgh’s rich clothing in
1610 suggests how his life had changed; no longer the protective leather jerkin but
a ‘ jerkin all of lace ’ and a ‘doublet of cloth of gold ’.56 Despite Roxburgh’s suc-
cesses, he never achieved high oﬃce in the English court, failing in 1616 to secure
the lord chamberlaincy of Prince Charles’s household. In 1619, however, he was
appointed to the prince’s Scottish advisory council and attended the council fairly
frequently when in Scotland.57 Roxburgh’s life, divided among London,
Holyrood, and his increasingly comfortable house near Kelso, epitomized the
way in which direct links could be maintained between James’s court, his Scottish
council, and government in the Borders.
James’s success in rewarding and retaining the loyalty and co-operation of
his borderer elite had wider implications for his plans for union. At a basic level,
this elite co-operated in the suppression of crime in the area that was meant
to exemplify union. They also co-operated within James’s increasingly in-
stitutionalized government as sheriﬀs, JPs, and Middle Shires commissioners and
some as councillors. This was of great signiﬁcance after 1603, when the Scottish
council governed on a day-to-day basis in James’s absence. As Elliott observes of
the Milanese or Neapolitan elites vis-a´-vis the crown of Aragon, the inclusion of
the provincial elites in government could underpin any union, diﬀusing any op-
position.58 If this was true of the non-contiguous regions of the various Spanish
territories, how much more secure would the careful treatment of the Scottish
elite in the Scottish Borders make the regnal union?
I I I
The relationships between Scottish courtiers, in particular the Borderers
Somerset, Murray of Lochmaben, and Sir Robert Ker of Ancrum, and the
Scottish Borders elite provided a crucial link between the formation and ex-
ecution of government policy. These courtiers became the focus for patronage
networks that extended from Whitehall into the outlying uplands of the region:
personal contacts with their allies on the Scottish council, Murray of Elibank,
55 Chamberlain, Letters, I, pp. 487, 504, 507; National Register of Archives Scotland (NRAS),
Roxburgh, 1100/1611, fo. 2. 56 NRAS 1100/1011, 1100/1277; Chamberlain, Letters, II, p. 102.
57 Chamberlain, Letters, II, p. 45 ; RPC, XII, pp. 59–60.
58 Elliott, ‘A Europe of composite monarchies ’, p. 56.
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Walter Scott, Lord Buccleuch, and Robert Ker of Oxnam, and their borderer
kin and allies, the Murrays, the Scotts, and the Kers, provided useful conduits
of inﬂuence, obligation, and communication. From 1605, these mechanisms
facilitated and rewarded the imposition of the paciﬁcation.
Chief amongst these networks was that headed by James’s favourite Somerset
from around 1608. Somerset’s upbringing and family were in Roxburghshire, and
it was predominantly to there that his Scottish network extended. His half-
brother was Sir Andrew Ker of Ferniehirst, a prominent landowner near
Jedburgh, and the leader of a rival branch of Kers to that headed by the new Lord
Roxburgh. His was an example of a career that burned too bright, crashing into
disgrace in 1615 within two years of its peak. For all its temporary nature, how-
ever, a study of Somerset’s links with his homeland shows the signiﬁcance of the
inﬂuence he held for himself, his alliance, and for James’s government in the
Scottish Borders. The relationships within Somerset’s patronage network suggest
the workings of James’s government, from London to Roxburghshire, and how
James could encourage service in other Scottish regions.
When Ker went south to court, by 1604, the Ferniehirst Kers were experi-
encing severe ﬁnancial problems and were overshadowed by their rival Ker
cousin, Lord Roxburgh. The hopes of the house of Ferniehirst were pinned on
their attractive, if not intellectual, kinsman. Ker was the prote´ge´ of Dunbar, a
distant kinsman and fellow borderer, who facilitated his appointment as groom of
the bedchamber from 1604 to 1607, when he was promoted to gentleman. In
1608, Ker of Ancrum, another kinsman, wrote hopefully to Ferniehirst from Paris
that he had heard gladly of Robert’s ‘preferment ’ but would be ‘gladder if it
shall please god to make him an instrument of what his duty should oblige him to.
I know the trust in his power or that can do alike with extraordinary or ordinary
reward. ’59 Both Ker and his family were alert to his potential.
Ker was also aware of his obligation to his family, in 1610 bemoaning his lack of
progress on their behalf : his nephew, Ferniehirst’s heir, Andrew Ker of Oxnam,
had attempted unsuccessfully to ﬁnd favour at court.
Sir, your sonne hes returned be my persuasione, as ﬁndinge yt tyme barren of hopes, and
friendes, My bussines at this tyme, could not suﬀer me to sho my kyndes to him, nor
spaire anie of my little power from thame, so as I wished him … to retyre himselfe home
and attend a better occasione, when I should have more power of my selfe …
[I] desyres you to Beleive thair is no Brother hes more good naturall afectione to your
personnes, nor wishes better to your fortune, And ye good of your house (In which I have a
deir interest).60
Ker’s execrable handwriting does not obscure the signiﬁcance of his message to
Ferniehirst. In 1610, the courtier did not feel himself secure enough to push his
kindred’s suits, but his expectation of power was also apparent. This belief proved
to have foundation. After Dunbar’s death in 1611, the Venetian ambassador
59 NAS, Lothian papers, GD40/2/13, fo. 2. 60 Ibid., GD40/2/12, fo. 20.
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observed that Ker appeared to have stepped into his mentor’s shoes, distributing
patronage and favour.61 Shortly afterwards, Ker became Viscount Rochester and
a privy councillor. By July 1612, following Salisbury’s death, he was de facto his
successor as secretary, receiving custody of the signet, whilst James vacillated over
ﬁlling the post oﬃcially. In 1613, he was elevated to the earldom of Somerset and,
by December 1613, Somerset in alliance with his future father-in-law, the earl of
Suﬀolk, held sway at court.62
Cuddy thinks that initially Somerset’s role was to act as James’s broker between
the faction of the earls of Northampton and Suﬀolk and that of Southampton,
rather than acting in his own right. If we look at what he was doing in Scotland,
however, Somerset seems to have been using his new inﬂuence almost immedi-
ately. In a letter of 1610, he wrote that James was willing to give Ferniehirst, his
brother, the title of Lord Jedburgh and that year, Somerset was granted extensive
lands, particularly in Dumfriesshire, from the forfeiture of John, Lord Maxwell.
He soon redistributed these to his Ker kinsmen and Ferniehirst received some of
these lands in 1612, Somerset referring to these ‘helpes ’ that he had ‘procured
from the king’ for his family.63 Despite his brother’s fall from grace in late 1615,
Ferniehirst retained James’s favour : in 1616, James ordered the Scottish council to
dispose of some disputed teinds in Roxburghshire, to Ferniehirst against the
wishes of Lord Roxburgh, his old enemy. In 1622, Ferniehirst ﬁnally became Lord
Jedburgh.64
Somerset was also able to engineer oﬃces in both Scotland and England for his
kindred. In 1611, his cousin Ker of Ancrum was appointed captain of the border
guard. Ancrum was seconded to London in 1613, to serve in Prince Charles’s
household, almost certainly at the instigation of Somerset, as James was to remind
him.65 Ancrum nominated his cousin and Somerset’s nephew Oxnam to replace
him as captain of the border guard. And when, in November 1613, James ap-
pointed his favourite treasurer of Scotland, Oxnam too became a councillor. This
represented a massive leap in Oxnam’s status, from heir-apparent to an im-
poverished estate, to membership of the highest governing council in the land.
Given that Somerset did not attend the council himself, Oxnam’s elevation was to
represent his uncle’s interests there. Oxnamwas an assiduous councillor, giving the
Ferniehirst and Ancrum Kers a ﬁrm foothold within the Scottish government.66
61 CSP Ven, XII, pp. 115–16, 135–6; Cuddy, ‘Revival of the entourage’, p. 208.
62 Salisbury had died in May 1612. From July 1612, English ambassadors and foreign dignitaries in
Europe addressed their correspondence to Ker. TNA, SP77/10–11, 78/59 fos. 195, 204, 214, 78/60–2,
80/3, 81/12–13, 82/5, 84/68–70, 92/1–3, 94/19–22, 99/10–20; Cuddy, ‘Revival of the entourage’,
pp. 209, 211.
63 NAS, Lothian papers, GD40/2/12, fo. 22. For example, Ker disposed of Maxwellhaugh to James
Ker of Overcrailing near Jedburgh. Registrum Magni Sigill Regum Scotorum (RMS), ed. J. M. Thomson
et al. (11 vols., Edinburgh, 1882–1914), VII, nos. 217, 613, 786; GD40/2/12, fo. 34.
64 NAS, Lothian papers, GD40/2/12, fo. 44.
65 Letters of James VI and I, ed. G. P. V. Akrigg (Berkeley, CA, 1984), p. 340.
66 RPCS, X, pp. 157, 170, 176, 184, 200; Anna Groundwater, ‘The Middle March of the Scottish
Borders, 1573 to 1625’ (Ph.D. Edinburgh, 2007) app. O.
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Somerset’s inﬂuence brought good fortune to his family with oﬃces, titles, and
lands. But more signiﬁcantly, through the appointment of such as Oxnam to the
guard, Ker’s patronage can be seen to be facilitating the imposition of crown
policy in the Borders. In 1613, Oxnam was also made a commissioner of the
Middle Shires and appointed to the conjunct commission in 1618. He remained
captain until 1621 when James ruled that the guard’s services were no longer
needed.67 In fulﬁlling his duties in the Borders, Oxnam utilized his network of
kinsmen and aﬃliates there: in 1616, the lieutenant of the guard was William Ker
of Grange and, in 1622, an exoneration for service in the guard was granted
to Oxnam’s brother William, George Ker apparent of Cavers and William
Ker, Ancrum’s brother.68 Through his councillorship, Oxnam’s activities in the
Borders were closely linked into the highest levels of Scottish government.
Through Somerset’s and, subsequently, Ancrum’s and Oxnam’s inﬂuence
over the distribution of oﬃces, the crown was able to utilize the Ker kindred in
eﬀecting the paciﬁcation.
Somerset’s network was not limited to the Kers. He was close to Dunbar, a
Home, and he was also related to another enthusiastic Middle Shires com-
missioner, Murray of Elibank. Elibank was connected to the Ferniehirsts through
the marriage of his half-sister, Janet Scott to Sir Thomas Ker of Ferniehirst : he
was thus an uncle to Ferniehirst and Somerset. Elibank was a key ﬁgure as an ally
in the Borders and he and Somerset beneﬁted mutually from their relationship. In
1611, Elibank, acting as Ker’s agent for his aﬀairs in Scotland, brought a case
before the council against the bailie of Caerlaverock, which had been granted to
Ker from Maxwell’s forfeiture. In 1612, Ker granted the Caerlaverock castle to
Elibank’s son, Patrick Murray of Langshaw, thus securing Elibank’s support on
the council and in the Borders.69 The same year, Elibank became deputy treas-
urer of Scotland, as a result of Somerset manoeuvring before his own admittance
as treasurer.70 Elibank embodied the linkage between the Borders and the
Scottish council – and through Somerset, with James at court.
Elibank’s power in the Borders was not only based upon his oﬃces and juris-
diction. His inﬂuence spread through his close familial links with the Scott kin-
dred, in particular Lord Buccleuch, and the powerful Murrays of Blackbarony
and Philiphaugh. In 1606, at Buccleuch’s ‘earnest sute ’, Elibank attempted
to intervene in a case against one of the Scott surname, ‘on promissis of
[Buccleuch’s] grit oﬃces in the advancement ’ of the paciﬁcation. It was a mu-
tually beneﬁcial relationship: in 1608, Buccleuch agreed to a tack of the teinds of
Hawick to Elibank. After Elibank’s elevation to the council, he could help the
Scotts at the highest level : in 1616, he secured a pardon from James for John Scott
of Tushielaw for the slaughter of another Scott.71 The close connection between
67 RPCS, X, p. 164, XI, pp. 344–8, XII, pp. 582–4, 657–60.
68 RPCS, XI, p. 217, XII, pp. 658–9. 69 RPCS, IX, p. 232; RMS, VII, nos. 636, 754.
70 RPCS, X, p. vii.
71 RPCS, VII, pp. 714–17; NAS, Lothian, GD32/20/19, GD224/918/27, fos. 4, 5.
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the council’s direction of the paciﬁcation and the Buccleuch’s involvement con-
tinued after Elibank’s death in 1621. The second Lord Buccleuch was a councillor
too, and he was also related to another councillor, Ker of Oxnam. From 1622
Buccleuch held additional jurisdiction in the Borders through his appointment
as a triumvir, in which he was able to use his extensive Scott kindred.
After 1603, government of the Borders was directly connected through the
Ferniehirst–Elibank–Buccleuch patronage networks from London to the wilds of
the Buccleuch-owned Liddesdale.
This network was potentially damaged by Somerset’s downfall in 1615. These
families were, however, fortunate to have another kinsman to look after
their interests at court, Robert Ker of Ancrum, from 1613 a gentleman in Prince
Charles’s household. Elibank’s family, the Murrays of Blackbarony, were further
linked into the Ferniehirst–Ancrum alliance by the marriage of Elibank’s neice,
Elizabeth, to Ancrum, and, in 1608, Blackbarony managed his aﬀairs in his ab-
sence. Ancrum attended Charles for many years, surviving the depletion of
Scotsmen in the king’s bedchamber after Charles’s accession as king.72 Ancrum
no doubt played some part in preserving the Kers’ fortunes after Somerset’s fall,
though, in early 1616, he was temporarily held as part of the investigations into
the murder of Sir Thomas Overbury in which Somerset was implicated.73 But
until Charles’s imprisonment, when Ancrum was forced to ﬂee into penurious
exile in Amsterdam, he remained an inﬂuential point of contact between the royal
court and the Scottish borderers in his alliance.
Ancrum’s longevity of service, and intimacy of access to James’s heir, gave him
signiﬁcant inﬂuence. As Charles put it, when writing to the countess of Derby,
‘what he wants in meanes he hath in neerness about my person’.74 In 1619,
Ancrum’s authority was increased following his appointment to Charles’s Scottish
council. For anyone wanting something done in Scotland, Ancrum could inter-
vene. For instance, when Elibank died, Ancrum was beseeched by several, in-
cluding the earl of Lauderdale, to support their applications to Charles for the late
treasurer’s oﬃce. Indeed, in 1623, Roxburgh was forced to write to Ancrum, the
son of the man he had killed in 1590, asking him to assure Charles of his ‘ treu
haert ’.75 And helpfully, for government in the Borders, Ancrum maintained his
close familial connections, returning occasionally, and maintaining a frequent
correspondence. Ancrum’s own family was employed in the paciﬁcation : his
younger brother William served on his cousin Ker of Oxnam’s border guard; his
wife’s uncle Elibank, one of its prime motivators. Thus the Ker kindred, and their
allies amongst the Murrays of Blackbarony, and the Scotts of Buccleuch, were
72 NAS, Lothian papers, GD40/2/13, fo. 1. Details of Ancrum’s career, and some of his corres-
pondence, are in Correspondence of Sir Robert Ker, ﬁrst earl of Ancram and his son William, third earl of Lothian,
ed. D. Laing (Edinburgh, 1875) ; the original letters are in GD40/2/13.
73 Chamberlain, Letters, I, p. 625. 74 NAS, Lothian papers, GD40/2/19/1, fo. 8.
75 RPCS, XII, pp. 59–60; NAS, Lothian papers, GD40/2/13, fo. 28, 40/9/8, fo. 1.
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intimately involved in the communication and execution of James’s policies in the
Borders.76
Ancrum’s service brought ﬁnancial and social rewards : in 1617, he was granted
an annuity of £300 from the great customs, which he did not surrender until 1637.
In 1630, he had a warrant for the reversion of the keepership of Marylebone
Park.77 Such grants enriched his life at court, and enabled him to develop his
family’s properties near Jedburgh. He was subsequently created the earl of
Ancram, and was able to manipulate his son’s marriage, in the 1620s, to the Ker
heiress of the second earl of Lothian and the absorption of the Lothian title and
lands into the Ancrams’ hands. Despite his success in England, however, it seems,
as Brown observes generally of Scottish courtiers, that Ancrum maintained his
Scottish lands, resisting the integration of his family into English society.78
Another Border courtier, John Murray of Lochmaben from Dumfriesshire,
was also able to facilitate government there. He was part of an extensive network
which included the Griersons of Lag and the Douglases of Drumlanrig in the
western Scottish Borders. From 1609, he was a groom of James’s bedchamber and
a gentleman from 1622, when he was created earl of Annandale. He was granted
lands in Cumberland in 1609, and a property in Guildford, Surrey. In 1620, he
was granted the ‘ fee farm of Gilforde Parke, one of the ﬁnest grounds they say in
England and of good value ’.79 In 1622, Lochmaben’s Borders connections were
underlined by his commission as triumvir, despite his lack of such experience. It
was not a successful appointment, given Annandale’s commitments in London.
Nor was he a major landholder in the region and therefore lacked the authority
associated with land and adherents. But he was still an important link between the
Borders and James in the direction of the paciﬁcation. Annandale was in London
in August 1623, when a dispute fell out over jurisdiction between Robert Maxwell,
the bumptious new earl of Nithsdale and Douglas of Drumlanrig – both Oxnam
and Nithsdale wrote begging Annandale for his support.80 In 1624, James noting
Ancrum’s ‘personall service attending ourselfe ’ appointed instead Lord Yester
and Sir John Stewart of Traquair from Peeblesshire.81 James clearly felt
Annandale was more useful to him at court, facilitating the communication of
policy from the king to powerful oﬃcials in the Borders, who were better placed
to carry out such directives.
In London, however, there was little to question Annandale’s inﬂuence : his
intimate access to James and his keepership of the privy purse made him a
powerful ﬁgure. Senior English councillors and courtiers were careful to maintain
good relations with him, Chamberlain observing that Lochmaben ‘always held
very great correspondency with the Secretary [Salisbury], and … got many a
76 Ibid., GD40/2/13, fos. 6, 12, 29.
77 TNA, E214/641; British Library (BL), Eg. 2553, fo. 82.
78 Brown, ‘Scottish aristocracy’, pp. 550, 564, 574–6.
79 TNA, E214/701, E134/7Jas1/Hil13, E134/8Jas1/East18; NLS, Denmilne, Adv. MS 31.1.7, vol.
22, fo. 38; Chamberlain, Letters, II, pp. 318, 412.
80 NLS, Denmilne, Adv. MS 31.1.1, vol. 10, fos. 112, 135. 81 RPC, XIII, pp. 542–3.
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thousand pound by his assignment ’.82 In 1614, Sir Francis Bacon wrote to
Lochmaben referring to his keepership of the seal, assuring Lochmaben of his
support, and noting that ‘Mr Secretary … is your frend and constant. ’83 Other
councillors used Lochmaben to communicate oﬃcial business to James : the earl
of Suﬀolk wrote of his meeting with the chancellor to settle the king’s business,
asking Lochmaben to ‘acquayant his Majestie with thus much’. The strength
of Annandale’s position was demonstrated further in 1623, by the duke of
Buckingham’s cultivation of him as a conduit to James during their abortive
Spanish escapade ; Buckingham thanked him for his ‘constant kindness ’, declar-
ing himself Annandale’s ‘ faithful frend and servant ’. Buckingham also linked
Annandale into his own familial network, in 1620, persuading him to allow his son
to marry the daughter of Buckingham’s brother-in-law, Lord Denbigh.84
Annandale’s inﬂuence was such that a number of senior Scottish councillors,
including Elibank, the chancellor Dunfermline, and the earl of Melrose, main-
tained a regular correspondence with him. This kept James well informed of
events and concerns in Scotland, whilst councillors thanked Annandale ‘ for let-
ting me know his Majesty’s mind’. Dunfermline was careful to assure
Lochmaben, ‘alwayis I wish yow [to] knaw all the guid oﬃces yow doe to me, are
done to a freind, to ane kinnisman’.85 Their language demonstrated that
Dunfermline and Elibank, despite their elevated positions, were very much the
supplicants with Lochmaben. Scottish councillors needed to sustain good re-
lationships with those commanding access to James. This was particularly true
following the disgrace of Elibank’s and Oxnam’s principal contact, Somerset, in
the winter of 1615. Elibank beseeched Lochmaben to speak on Oxnam’s behalf
with James, since Oxnam’s enemies would not fail ‘ to seik his harme and skaithe
at this tyme when he hes not my Lord Somerset to stand for him’.86 Elibank, also
vulnerable, wrote a deeply thankful letter to James in 1615 for his ‘extraordinarie ’
favours, despite the ‘ruyne of my unhappie kinsman’. Similarly in 1616, Elibank,
worrying over his two-year absence from court, asked Lochmaben to intercede
with James against some evil reports of him.87 He also asked Lochmaben to
protect the grants that he, Elibank, had made in Scotland on behalf of their
relatives, such as the oﬃce of comptroller of the ordinance that Elibank had given
to his nephew, James Murray.88
This channelling of favour operated in both directions. Dunfermline, ac-
knowledging Lochmaben’s help, wrote that he would not ‘prove unthankfull, as it
82 Cuddy, ‘Revival of the entourage’, p. 198. He was keeper of the privy purse to at least 1625. BL,
Add. 35832, fo. 153.
83 Bacon is almost certainly referring to Somerset here. NLS, Denmilne, Adv. MS 33.1.7, vol. 22, fo.
15 ; Chamberlain, Letters, I, p. 521. Bacon and Lochmaben corresponded from at least 1607 to 1615.
NLS, Denmilne, Adv. MS 33.1.7, vol. 22, fos. 7, 8, 13, 17 ; BL, Sloane 3078, fo. 51b; BL, Add. 4106, fos.
95, 96, 96b, 98b.
84 NLS, Denmilne, Adv. MS 33.1.7, vol. 22, fos. 23, 83, 86; Brown, ‘Scottish aristocracy’, p. 572.
85 NLS, Denmilne, Adv. MS 33.1.1, vol. 5, fos. 45, 47, 48, 103.
86 Ibid., vol. 6, fos. 51, 52. 87 Ibid., vol. 6, fo. 57, vol. 7, fo. 2. 88 Ibid., fos. 9, 32.
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may pleis yow [to] employ me’, whilst Lochmaben had Melrose to thank for
defending his interests in Scotland, particularly with the earl of Nithsdale.
Melrose also intervened to publicize Annandale’s commission to the triumvirate
of the Middle Shires when his deputies there ‘ found no obedience’, Nithsdale
writing to Annandale that it was impossible to ‘oversie the particulers of your
Lordships cuntrie bussines heir, except you appoynt sum man or other to wrak
over your oﬃsers ’. Scottish courtiers in London were as dependent on their
kinsmen and allies to maintain their interests in their absence at home, as their
clients needed representation at court.89 James too needed the communication
lines that these patronage networks provided, to transmit policy to the Borders,
but also to keep himself advised of Scottish events. In 1614, Lochmaben enquired
of Dunfermline, ‘What yee wald have hes majestie doe in [resolving the dispute
between Lord Sanquahr and Douglas of Drumlanrig] … let me knowe. ’90
Around 1615, James wrote asking for an account of what happened between the
earl of Home and the archbishop when Home was conﬁned, which a gossipy
Elibank was happy to supply.91 In return, James was keen to let his Scottish coun-
cillors know the news from England: as Lochmaben explained to Dunfermline
in 1615, ‘ I have wreittin these lynnes to yr honor by his majesties derectione to
lett yow understand’ the circumstances of the king of Denmark’s visit.92 Failure
to ‘keep open such lines of communication and patronage’, as Elliott notes of
Philip IV of Spain and Charles I, was disastrous : in doing so ‘ they had deprived
themselves of the local knowledge required to save them from egregious mistakes
of execution’.93 James VI and I was cannier than that.
I V
It is clear that lines of communication were regularly and eﬀectively used,
from the court in London, through the Scottish council, to the landed elite in the
Scottish Borders – and from there to London. These routes could be used to
disseminate crown policies, distribute patronage and staﬀ oﬃces at both national
and regional levels, and, conversely, they provided a conduit through which the
concerns of prominent local ﬁgures, and their advice, could be presented to
James. In this way they replicated the function of the councils of ‘native counci-
lors attendant on the [Spanish] king … providing a forum in which local opinions
and grievances could be voiced at court, and local knowledge could be used in the
determination of policy ’.94
In 1613, the Scottish dominance within the royal households was at its zenith.
Chamberlain moaned that ‘nothing of any moment is don here but by
[Somerset’s] mediation, and sure yt is a marvaylous straunge fact that three
89 Ibid., vol. 5, fos. 103, 139, 141, vol. 10, fo. 111. 90 Ibid., fo. 50.
91 NLS, Denmilne, Adv. MS 33.3.12, vol. 15, fo. 30.
92 NLS, Denmilne, Adv. MS 33.1.1, vol. 5, fo. 50.
93 Elliott, ‘A Europe of composite monarchies’, p. 64. 94 Ibid., p. 55.
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Roberts of the same surname shold be so greate and powerfull, about the King,
Quene and Prince, all [at] one time’, that is the Kers of Somerset, Roxburgh, and
Ancrum.95 These Scottish courtiers, as the focus of patronage networks which
radiated out into the Scottish Borders, helped to maintain the crown’s working
relationship with the elite there. The pyramidical structure of such networks
meant that as they widened, these courtiers also became the focus of other net-
works which included non-related Scottish councillors, such as the chancellor
Dunfermline, and thence through his own personal connections amongst the
Seton kindred and the Montgomerie earls of Eglinton to other Scottish regions.96
The eﬀectiveness of these links was rooted in these courtiers’ intimate access to
James: for those left out of such networks, this meant that it was much harder
to ask the king anything. Given that these patronage networks were helping
to maintain co-operative relations between James and his provincial elites,
James ran the risk of alienating those not included within them. The xenophobic
speeches of John Holles in 1610, and John Hoskins, in 1614, indicated English
fears over the Scottish monopoly of James’s attention.97 Similar concerns over
contact engendered the complaints of the disgruntled Edinburgh burgesses,
which were exacerbated by the huge costs of sending representatives south to
James; a cost which would have been minimized by having a permanent ally
resident in Whitehall. Further work is needed now on the eﬀects of the alienation
of those excluded from the beneﬁts of such channels ; for those such as the laird of
Skelmurlie whose chances against Dunfermline’s nephew, Eglinton, were un-
dermined by the chancellor’s request to Lochmaben that James be reminded
Skelmurlie was ‘ane kittill, mutinous and onsatled man, full oﬀ consaittis, readie
to rase ’ trouble ; or the earl of Angus writing dolorously of the ‘want of your
maiesteis gracious presence, be[ing] unto me ane just caus of exceiding greiﬀ
and sorrow’.98 It was not only those excluded that lost out. The reciprocity of
patron–client relationships, from king down to regional elites, meant that
any blockage in the conduits of information, obligation, and co-operation was
potentially harmful to the king too. Whilst the Scottish dominance of the bed-
chamber under James probably maintained suﬃcient correspondence between
Whitehall and Scotland, their diminished presence under Charles, and the in-
creasingly formalized access that Charles insisted upon, was to damage these lines
of communication.
For the paciﬁcation of the Scottish Borders, however, the lines were very much
open: the connections between Somerset, Lochmaben, and Ancrum and their
allies in the Borders formed a crucial component within James’s governance of his
newly uniﬁed kingdoms. By 1611, the paciﬁcation was deemed a success in terms
of the suppression of cross-border crime, though internal crime (itself reduced) in
95 Chamberlain, Letters, I, p. 510.
96 NLS, Denmilne, Adv. MS 33.1.1, vol. 5, fos. 67, 99, 103.
97 HMC Portland, IX, p.113 ; Chamberlain, Letters, I, p. 538.
98 NLS, Denmilne, Adv. MS, 33.1.1, vol. 1, fo. 5, vol. 5, fo. 48.
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the Borders continued to draw oﬃcial condemnation. In many ways it replicated
the successful paciﬁcation of the Welsh marches under Henry VIII, achieved
through the well-rewarded co-operation of the Welsh gentry. The paciﬁcation
was less successful, however, in terms of the symbolism it had been intended to
provide of harmonious cross-border co-operation. Disputatious relations between
the commissioners on each side of the border, and enduring administrative and
judicial divisions within the composite Middle Shires, continued to exemplify the
tensions within the young multiple monarchy at its very heart.
Despite these tensions, the connections between the Kers and their allies
nevertheless show how networks of patronage could act as a cohesive force within
the new ‘Britain ’. That these Borderers continued to attract the favour of a king
with so many new diversions says something for the strength of ties that could be
fostered. By imposing English viceroys in the Irish pale, both Tudor and Stuart
kings denied themselves the beneﬁts of such networks. In Scotland, the use of
patron–client relationships to eﬀect government was a long-standing tradition,
drawing on alliances which harked back to the mid-sixteenth century. The inte-
gration that these could foster was also of use to James in the new ‘Britain ’,
patronage systems extending relatively easily to encompass the realities of a king
now living 400 miles to the south. Such networks helped to hold together the
loosely uniﬁed kingdoms, united only in the body of their king.
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